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Changelog

All notable changes will be documented here.

[Unreleased]

Added

  • Strict source-bound obligation manifest.
  • Automated JSON assertions, manual review attestations, external attestations, and explicit unverifiable obligations.
  • Deterministic receipt payload with offline verification and replay.
  • Synthetic accessibility-acceptance demonstration.
  • Pinned CI, security, packaging, and build-only release-candidate workflows.
  • Portfolio conformance, data-governance, incident-response, observability, release, and internationalization declarations.
  • Unrated official public-SOW sample candidates with two byte-frozen source digests.
  • AI-assisted development disclosure in the README, separating development provenance from the no-LLM product boundary.
  • A protect-tags GitHub ruleset requiring signed, non-deletable, non-rewritable tags, alongside the existing protected-main ruleset.
  • SBOM generation and a keyless cosign signature over dist/SHA256SUMS in the release-candidate workflow, next to the existing build-provenance attestation.
  • security and incident repository labels, and a private-advisory reporting route documented in SECURITY.md.

Changed

  • Make the M0 internationalization exemption mechanically auditable with its exact scope, re-entry seam, owner, and review date.
  • Replace tag-triggered ambient release-candidate builds with explicit signed-tag authorization from protected main, exact-commit checkout, and candidate build provenance without granting publication authority; verify that boundary from permission and publisher semantics rather than a comment.
  • Bound contract-source hashing at 16 MiB and reject blocking special files.
  • Reject platform-dependent source/evidence path spellings before filesystem access.
  • Bind attestations to exact evidence IDs to prevent within-obligation reuse.
  • Preserve content digests for present malformed JSON while retaining unresolved status.
  • Validate and bound receipt documents before atomic writes.
  • Reject byte-identical discovery rater files as non-independent.
  • Reject duplicate JSON object keys and non-finite JSON numbers across evidence, attestation, and receipt inputs.
  • Reject negative, signed, leading-zero, non-ASCII, and otherwise non-canonical JSON Pointer array indices.
  • Enforce exact closed fields for receipt and attestation envelopes.
  • Parse and hash evidence from one bounded descriptor-stable byte snapshot.
  • Bound JSON to 64 levels and 100,000 nodes, translate invalid UTF-8, and reject boolean/number equality ambiguity.
  • Validate the closed receipt payload schema, counts, evidence compatibility, result algebra, and offset-bearing claimed timestamp.
  • Write receipts through collision-resistant atomic temporary files.
  • Add deterministic two-rater discovery metrics and a typed-wheel content gate.
  • Add a closed, deterministic evidence-collection plan with redacted portable and explicit local-sensitive profiles.
  • Add checksum self-consistency and exact manifest-regeneration verification for evidence plans, without reading evidence or claiming an outcome.
  • Add a closed single-declared-evidence diagnostic that preserves pass, fail, missing, and review-required states with distinct CLI exits.
  • Bind single checks to contract/source/manifest/obligation/evidence identities while omitting paths, content, assertion details, and aggregate conclusions.
  • Breaking: extend the single-check exit-code discipline to the whole CLI from one shared obligation_receipts.exit_codes contract, so exit 2 now means only "no result document was produced". evaluate previously returned 2 for a rejected or incomplete evaluation — the same code as an unreadable manifest, an absent evidence root, or a source-digest mismatch — leaving an automated acceptance pipeline unable to tell an evaluated negative outcome from a tool failure. rejected is now 1 and incomplete is 3. verify likewise returns 1 for a payload-digest or replay mismatch, because a receipt that does not reproduce is an integrity finding about that receipt rather than a failure to read it.
  • Check the --manifest/--evidence-root pairing for verify before reading the receipt, so an incomplete invocation is reported as such instead of as whatever the receipt path happened to fail on first.

Fixed

  • Restore the zizmor CI check to green. Its impostor-commit audit cannot read the private portfolio-standards repo that release.yml pins as a reusable workflow, and errors out for the whole file rather than skipping just that reference; the audit is disabled with a documented scope and re-entry condition in .github/zizmor.yml rather than left permanently red or silenced with an unscoped workaround.
  • Switch the zizmor job off the SARIF/GitHub-Advanced-Security upload path (advanced-security: true, the action's default), which always failed because code scanning is not enabled on this private repo, in favor of plain GitHub Actions annotations; zizmor's own exit code still fails the job on real findings, and the job no longer needs security-events or actions permissions to run.