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Security policy

habitable is built for people under threat of retaliation. Its security is the product, not a feature — so please report problems, and please do so privately until they are fixed.

Reporting a vulnerability

Preferred: use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting on this repository (the Security tab → Report a vulnerability). This keeps the report confidential and lets us coordinate a fix and advisory.

Please include: what you found, how to reproduce it (on synthetic data — never real tenant data), the impact you foresee, and any suggested remediation.

We aim to acknowledge a report within 3 business days and to ship a fix or a documented mitigation within 90 days, coordinating disclosure with you. There is no paid bug bounty; credit is given in the advisory unless you prefer anonymity.

What we care about most

The guarantees in README.md and docs/threat-model.md are the security contract. Reports that undermine any of these are highest priority:

  • Confidentiality at rest / in transit — any way to read vault contents without the key, or to recover plaintext from a relay or timestamp authority.
  • Tamper-evidence — any way to alter a sealed original, a chain of custody, or a timestamp token such that habitable verify still reports a packet as intact (e.g. backdating without detection).
  • Unintended disclosure — any path by which an exported packet leaks location or custody identities contrary to the sharing policy.
  • Verifier soundness — any way the standalone verifier accepts evidence it should reject (or the reverse).

Scope and limits

  • This is alpha, concept-stage software. Do not rely on it for real legal matters yet. See Honest limits in README.md.
  • Cryptography uses well-reviewed primitives via cryptography and standard RFC 3161 timestamping; we are not rolling our own ciphers. Reports of misuse of those primitives are in scope; theoretical breaks of the primitives themselves are out of scope here.
  • The bundled development TSA (DevTSA) is explicitly non-production and is not a trusted timestamp source; that is by design, not a vulnerability.

Supply chain

Dependencies are pinned and locked (uv.lock); GitHub Actions are pinned to commit SHAs; CI runs pip-audit and CodeQL. Reports about the build or release path are welcome.