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Changelog

All notable changes to this project will be documented in this file.

The format is based on Keep a Changelog, and this project adheres to Semantic Versioning.

[1.0.0] - 2026-08-30

Added [STABLE]

  • Runtime Enforcer Engine (ContractEnforcer) [STABLE]:
    • ContractEnforcer.load(path: str | Path) -> ContractEnforcer: Loads, validates, and deep-freezes contracts with SHA-256 integrity hash verification.
    • ContractEnforcer.gate(action_name: str, action_type: Literal["side_effect", "permission"]): Decorator factory providing default-deny gating for synchronous and asynchronous functions.
    • ContractEnforcer.get_audit_log() -> list[AuditEntry]: Returns a tamper-proof deep copy of all session authorization decisions.
    • ContractEnforcer.verify_integrity() -> bool: Verifies that the contract file on disk has not been altered since load time.
    • ContractEnforcer.approve(action_name: str, token: str = ""): Synchronous approval stub for manual confirmation flows.
    • ContractEnforcer.assert_gated(fn: Any) -> bool: Utility to assert that a sensitive integration function is wrapped with an enforcer gate (Threat T4 mitigation).
  • Core Exceptions Hierarchy [STABLE]:
    • ContractViolationError(action_name, contract_path, suggestion): Raised on undeclared actions (Default-Deny).
    • ContractTamperError(message): Raised on attempted mutations of frozen contract objects or disk file mismatch.
    • ApprovalPendingError(action_name, approval_config): Raised when an action hits an approval requirement.
    • ContractVersionError(message): Raised on version constraint or invariant mismatches.
    • ContractValidationError(message, errors): Raised on schema or security constraint failures.
  • Audit Logging [STABLE]:
    • AuditEntry frozen dataclass with fields: timestamp, action_name, action_type, decision, reason, contract_field_reference.

Security

  • Threat Mitigations implemented:
    • T4: Gate bypass detection via assert_gated(fn).
    • T5: Runtime contract file replacement defense via SHA-256 hash tracking and immutable object freezing.
    • T7: Load-time and schema-level prohibition of wildcard permissions (*, all, any).
    • T8: Load-time warning for irreversible side effects without approval boundaries.
    • T9: Tamper-proof audit logging with immutable entries and deep-copied log outputs.
    • T10: Strict version cross-validation.

[0.3.0] - 2026-08-30

Added

  • Lifecycle Governance Specification (v1.1):
    • Added lifecycle object to WORKFLOW-CONTRACT-SPEC.md and schemas/v1.1/contract.schema.json.
    • Closed lifecycle mode taxonomy: request-response, scheduled, persistent.
    • Mandatory idle_behavior description for persistent agents via JSON Schema if/then rules.
    • Optional irreversible: boolean flag on side effects.
    • ContractVersion enum (V1 = "1", V1_1 = "1.1") and explicit version detection in detect_contract_version().
    • apply_lifecycle_defaults() applying {mode: request-response, initiation: human-only, resumability: stateless} to v1 contracts with a transparency warning.
  • Tier 2 Semantic Linter Additions:
    • [AC301] Vague idle behavior warning for persistent agents (Threat T2).
    • [AC302] Irreversible side effect without approval boundary warning (Threat T8).
  • RFC 0002: Specification RFC for the Lifecycle field and migration path (rfcs/0002-lifecycle-field.md).

[0.2.0] - 2026-08-30

Fixed

  • Canonical Filename Enforcement:
    • Enforced contract.yaml as the canonical filename across all tooling.
    • Introduced ContractFileNameError raised when .yml is encountered with an actionable message.
  • Repository Integrity Audit:
    • Audited all directory paths and verified implementation folders.